For: Readers who want to evaluate claims about human irrationality.
Begin here
MIT OpenCourseWare · Source-checked annotation
Lecture 13: Thinking
The MIT session connects concrete puzzles to heuristics and framing, offering examples that can be reconstructed rather than merely labelled.
Calling a choice biased requires a comparison. Was relevant information ignored? Was a probability calculation mistaken? Did the person pursue a different goal from the one the observer assumed? These possibilities should be separated before an error label becomes an explanation of the person.
MIT’s thinking session is a useful start because its official outline links concrete problems to functional fixedness, heuristics, anchoring and framing. Reconstruct an example in your own words. Specify the information, available responses and criterion for success before asking which mental shortcut might explain an answer.
Noba’s judgement chapter sets out a proposed systematic decision procedure and contrasts it with examples of confidence, anchoring and framing. Use it to distinguish a normative proposal—how a decision should be made under specified goals—from a descriptive claim about what people tend to do. The two claims need different kinds of support.
The additional selections deliberately widen the standards of comparison. Conditional probability supplies a mathematical rule when the problem concerns evidence. Gendler’s utilitarianism lecture introduces one moral framework; disagreement with that framework is not, by itself, an arithmetic error. Her discussion of sampling bias also reminds us that a striking classroom example is not automatically a reliable estimate for a wider population.
For the exercise, vary the wording of a fictional problem while holding its stated outcomes fixed. A changed answer would motivate a question about framing. It would not immediately establish a universal effect, its size or its mechanism. Different participants may interpret the wording differently, and the task may leave important goals unstated.
This guide teaches a way to read claims about bias rather than a catalogue of labels to apply to other people. Its foundational lectures are historically situated. Continue with probability if you need a clearer formal standard, or with strategic interaction when the outcome depends on what another person chooses.
Build the connection
Open Yale Courses · Source-checked annotation
Lecture 4 - Parts of the Soul II
Compare arguments and sampling. Gendler brings sampling bias and dual-process accounts into the same introductory discussion.
NPTEL — National Programme on Technology Enhanced Learning
Heuristics and Framing Effects
Focus on framing. A behavioural-economics lecture explicitly pairs heuristics with framing effects.
MIT OpenCourseWare · Source-checked annotation
Lecture 2: Conditioning and Bayes' Rule
Specify a probability standard. Conditional probability provides a clear mathematical comparison when a task concerns evidence.
Open Yale Courses · Source-checked annotation
Lecture 12 - Utilitarianism and its Critiques
Distinguish a value judgement. The utilitarianism lecture illustrates that evaluating a choice can involve a moral criterion, not just a probability calculation.
NPTEL — National Programme on Technology Enhanced Learning
Bayesian Updating and Confirmation Bias
Connect updating and bias. The named Bayesian-updating lecture gives a route into the behavioural-economics treatment.
Change a frame, hold the outcomes fixed
Take a fictional choice with two options. Write the information and goal, choose a comparison rule, then change only the wording. Explain what a changed answer would and would not demonstrate.
Exercise or methods at source ↗Read alongside
- Judgment and decision making — Noba
State a comparison rule before calling a judgement biased.
Next step
Use the uncertainty path to establish a formal comparison before interpreting a response as mistaken.
Limits of this route
The foundational psychology and philosophy lectures are dated teaching material. Examples and definitions do not establish current effect sizes or universal mechanisms; the exercise illustrates a comparison, not a population result. Source checks establish scope and selection usefulness; they do not claim full-video viewing, human review or scientific validation.
Sources and editorial check · 2026-11-07
Individual publisher overviews for selected Yale/MIT material; ordered official NPTEL outlines and available course descriptions; the specifically identified supporting reading sections. Each source record states its inspection limit.
Checked by agent. This is not human peer review.
- Lecture 13: Thinking — official publisher material
- Lecture 4 - Parts of the Soul II — official publisher material
- Principles of Behavioral Economics — official course outline
- Lecture 2: Conditioning and Bayes' Rule — official publisher material
- Lecture 12 - Utilitarianism and its Critiques — official publisher material
- Judgment and decision making — Noba
- MIT probability — syllabus and prerequisites