# A first route through strategic interaction

Preserves order within Yale’s course while selecting a bridge from simultaneous choice to timing, information and repetition.

1. [Lecture 1 - Introduction: Five First Lessons](https://oyc.yale.edu/economics/econ-159/lecture-1)
   Begin by distinguishing an outcome from its value to each player, using the course’s classroom games.
   Task: Construct a two-player table with explicit outcomes and payoffs. Change a player’s preferences while keeping the physical outcomes fixed.

2. [Lecture 2 - Putting Yourselves into Other People's Shoes](https://oyc.yale.edu/economics/econ-159/lecture-2)
   Reasoning about another player introduces assumptions about their information and expectations.
   Task: Write what each player knows and believes in your example. Identify a conclusion that needs more than each player knowing only their own payoff.

3. [Lecture 3 - Iterative Deletion and the Median-Voter Theorem](https://oyc.yale.edu/economics/econ-159/lecture-3)
   Iterated deletion turns those assumptions into a procedure and a model of electoral competition.
   Task: Mark one dominated strategy in a small table, if one exists. Explain what additional assumption is needed before deleting another player’s strategy in response.

4. [Lecture 4 - Best Responses in Soccer and Business Partnerships](https://oyc.yale.edu/economics/econ-159/lecture-4)
   Best responses connect a specified belief about another action to the player’s own choice.
   Task: For each possible opposing action, identify a best response. Keep ties visible rather than forcing a single answer.

5. [Lecture 5 - Nash Equilibrium: Bad Fashion and Bank Runs](https://oyc.yale.edu/economics/econ-159/lecture-5)
   Nash equilibrium asks whether the players’ choices are mutually consistent best responses.
   Task: Find the equilibria of your table. Separately ask which outcome each player prefers; explain why these are different questions.

6. [Lecture 13 - Sequential Games: Moral Hazard, Incentives, and Hungry Lions](https://oyc.yale.edu/economics/econ-159/lecture-13)
   Sequential games add timing and later opportunities to revise a choice.
   Task: Draw a short decision tree and work backwards. Mark one threat that the player would not want to carry out when its turn arrived.

7. [Lecture 18 - Imperfect Information: Information Sets and Sub-Game Perfection](https://oyc.yale.edu/economics/econ-159/lecture-18)
   Information sets show why moves occurring in order need not mean the later player knows the earlier action.
   Task: Compare two trees with identical available actions but different information. Identify which inference from backward reasoning needs reconsideration.

8. [Lecture 21 - Repeated Games: Cooperation vs. the End Game](https://oyc.yale.edu/economics/econ-159/lecture-21)
   Repeated games add future consequences, making the stopping rule a key part of the model.
   Task: Compare a known final round with uncertain continuation. Write what would make a promised future response credible under each arrangement.

Original route: Evidence Press, CC BY 4.0. Linked teaching material retains its own rights. No videos or YouTube API payloads are included.